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INTRODUCTION
In evaluating the future of Critical Race Theory (CRT), Professors
Richard Delgado and Kevin Johnson engaged in a dialogue about
whether CRT has become too "idealist" in its focus and too concerned
about the "discourse of inequality," as opposed to the "materialist" view
that we must direct our focus toward tangible power disparities-illustrated
by problems within substantive areas such as criminal justice, housing dis-
crimination, and employment discrimination-which require restructuring
at a foundational level.' At another level, this debate asks whether we can
continue to focus on "racial" injustice and overlook the economics of
class injustice, which is central to both domestic and global disparities
among groups and populations. That question is also one of the starting
points for Professor Torres' and Guinier's work on "political race" in The
Miner's Canary.'
This essay posits that CRT must operate at both the "idealist" and
"materialist" levels. Although the emphasis may be in one direction or
another at particular times, both domains are continually engaged. This
essay links the debate between the "materialist" and "idealist" views to
* Professor of Law and Executive Director, Indian Legal Program, Arizona State
University.
1. Richard Delgado, Crossroads and Blind Alleys: A Critical Examination of Recent
Writing about Race, 82 TEX. L. REv. 121 (2003); Kevin R.Johnson, Roll Over Beethoven:A
Critical Examination of Recent Writing About Race, 82 TEX. L. REV. 717 (2004).
2. LANi GUINIER & GERALD ToaaRs, THE MINEa'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RE-
SISTING POWER, TANSrORMING DEMOCRACY, 11, 22 (2002).
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another central theme within CRT, which is the need for "justice" and
how the law relates to justice. This essay focuses on the contemporary
debate surrounding the status of Native Hawaiians to show how "race" is
being used to construct the civil and political rights of Native Hawaiian
people. CRT is a jurisprudence of possibility precisely because it rejects
standard liberal frameworks and precisely because it seeks to be inclusive
of different groups and different experiences. As I envision the future of
CRT, I want to engage a discussion about "justice" and the relationship of
justice to political or racial healing. Thus, this essay seeks to identify the
foundation for CRT, as the need to achieve "social justice" for groups that
have suffered a history of oppression, and to engage what it means to
"heal" injustice which is embedded in society at the level of both struc-
ture and consciousness. Part I of the essay explicates the scholarly debate
between Professors Delgado and Johnson and offers three general themes
which are useful to understand CRT as a vehicle for transformative
thought in American jurisprudence. Part II probes the relationship of
justice to law, drawing on contemporary work in political theory dealing
with transformative political change, and sets the framework for the case
study on contemporary Native Hawaiian political and legal rights, which
is featured in Part III. In analyzing the case study, this essay examines the
historical context within which Native Hawaiian rights are situated, and
compares the analysis in the federal court cases that are constructing con-
temporary Native Hawaiian rights as well as the rights of non-Natives.
Finally, Part IV of the essay explores the theme of racial healing and sug-
gests how the idealist and materialist frameworks of thought within CRT
might be used to effectuate the necessary change.
I. UNDERSTANDING CRT AS AVEHICLE
FOR TRANSFORMATIVE THOUGHT
Professor Delgado initiates his critique with the premise that CRT
had a "promising beginning," but then "began to focus almost exclusively
on discourse at the expense of power, history, and similar material deter-
minants of minority-group fortunes."3 Professor Delgado identifies a key
issue: "are race and racism, at bottom, real, or are they social construc-
tions?",4 He claims that this question is at the center of a "largely
unrecognized" divide within CRT and modern progressive thought in
general. The "idealist" school holds that race and discrimination are
largely functions of attitude and social formation.' Race is a "social con-
3. Delgado, supra note 1, at 122.
4. Id. at 123.
5. Id.
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struction created out of words, symbols, stereotypes and categories.' 6
Combatting discrimination, then, requires us to "rid ourselves of the texts,
narratives, ideas and meaning that give rise to it and convey" negative
messages about particular racial groups. Scholars working from this per-
spective use discourse analysis to analyze hate speech, cultural imagery,
and census categories, as well as to evaluate issues such as "intersectional-
ity" and "essentialism" to identify unconscious or institutional racism,
which is the pernicious, but hidden, force behind tangible inequalities.7
In comparison, scholars within the "realist" or "materialist" school
agree that text, attitude and intention are important in constructing social
hierarchies, but they believe that "material factors such as profits and the
labor market are even more decisive in determining who falls where in
that system."8 Racism is a mechanism to apportion privilege, wealth, and
status. 9 Racial realists "examine the role of international relations and
competition, the interests of elite groups, and the changing demands of
the labor market" in order to identify how racial groups benefit or suffer
at particular times in history.1° The legal system is a key institution in this
process because it either sanctions or punishes racial discrimination, de-
pending upon which larger goal is at play. Professor Delgado claims that
in the early years the realist analysis dominated CRT, and he cites several
examples, including Derrick Bell's "interest convergence" theory, which
maintained that "the self interest of elite Whites determined civil rights
progress more than conscience or altruism did."" Today, Professor
Delgado says, "CRT is almost entirely dominated by the analysis of text,
discourse, and mindset, leaving huge deficiencies in our understanding of
the institutional role of racism in society and the way that law is being
used to tailor solutions that serve the interests of dominant groups."12
Professor Johnson's response notes the important intersections be-
tween the two schools of thought and suggests that Delgado "overstates
the distinction between ideal and material forms of discourse."13 Accord-
ing to Johnson, there are deep interrelationships between the two schools
of thought that require "a study of both, as well as how they are con-
nected."1 4 In particular, idealist discourse promotes an understanding of
how society rationalizes the racial subordination created by power dispari-




9. Id. at 124.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 124-25.
13. Johnson, supra note 1, at 719.
14. Id. at 720.
15. Id.
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employment opportunities for minorities results in economic inequality. 6
Whites materially benefit from this, and minorities suffer. Because Whites
have a vested interest in the economic status quo, they will use various
strategies to justify its continuation, drawing upon negative cultural im-
ages, "shared understandings," and an "ideology" or "received wisdom"
that is passed down through time to make "current social arrangements
seem fair and natural.' 17 Johnson's analysis is based in large part upon
Delgado's earlier work endorsing the "legal storytelling movement."
Both Delgado and Johnson are important scholarly voices in CRT,
and both are correct in the sense that they are identifying what is neces-
sary to further the development of the scholarly work in CRT, which has
always been focused on addressing important justice issues for people of
color. Furthermore, the dialogue inspires CRT scholars to continue to
"push the margins," to be unafraid of the criticisms of outsiders, and to
continue to grow and evolve the intellectual discipline as social conditions
change. However, I think there is a larger point to be made. CRT is now
in a position to develop a transformative ethic by which to critique law,
social institutions, and American jurisprudence. '  I would suggest that
there are three broader themes within CRT scholarship that enable it to
become a vehicle for transformative thought in American jurisprudence.
First, CRT is an organizational concept for generating knowledge
about injustice-social, economic, and legal-and the way injustice is opera-
tionalized within our society. Thus, as Professor Brooks has noted, CRT
brings together various race-based theories, values and attitudes in order
to critique the existing legal and political order.19 The "standard" law
school curriculum is often bereft of alternatives to the formalistic Anglo-
American liberal epistemology that governs our jurisprudence. CRT has
become a liberating discourse within American law because it supports
the view (Which is experienced by many people of color, but not gener-
ally acknowledged by jurists from the dominant American legal tradition)
that racism is REAL, and that American society and its institutions are
fundamentally racist at some level, in the sense that racism is the norm
and NOT a deviation from the norm in American society. Now, we can
all split hairs about what we MEAN by "race" and "racism" and whether
the racism is "structural" or "procedural" But that initial observation
about what is the normative basis for American jurisprudence is very im-
portant.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 720-21 (quoting Delgado's earlier work on legal storytelling).
18. Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to Federal
Pleading, 11 HtAv. BLACKLETTER LJ. 85 (1994) (pulling together the discipline of CRT
around "four recurring intellectual themes: common objective; methodology; values and
assumptions; epistemology").
19. Id. at 85-86.
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Second, scholars of CRT are generally working toward some view
of "racial equality. ' 20 In other words, if racism is the "norm" in American
society, then we ought to be working toward a norm of "racial equality"
where different groups will not continue to suffer the oppression and
subordination that they have suffered. Again, much of the literature in
this area asks whether equality should be "symmetrical" in the sense that
all groups are truly treated the "same" or whether "assimilation" would
result from this.2' Conversely, if we take into account that groups are situ-
ated differently and must necessarily be treated "differently" if parity is
ever to be achieved, then how do we ensure "justice" under an "asymmet-
rical" model? The discussion over "symmetrical" or "asymmetrical"
equality is important and valid, but the bottom line is that everyone
agrees that the current structure is not fair, that the historical conditions
for injustice are vast and pervasive and the effects of this history continue
into the present, and that we ought to be working toward "racial justice,"
however we understand that concept.
22
Finally, a major accomplishment of CRT is to legitimize a jurispru-
dence that is based in part on an experiential epistemology, rather than a
purely rationalist epistemology. The dominant approach within Ameri-
can legal education is founded upon the rationalist epistemology that
undergirds American law and jurisprudence.4 Students are taught to ana-
lyze the logic of cases and doctrines, to distinguish between "relevant"
facts and those not relevant to the "holding," and to generate arguments
that appeal to abstract reason, deductive logic, and empirical validation.
American jurisprudence depends upon the rationalist epistemology of
Western thought that is entrenched within liberalism. However, liberal
theories ofjustice are often inadequate to engage the disparities and issues
identified by CRT scholars. Thus, the experiential epistemology of CRT
encompasses the knowledge that stems from the perspectives and
20. See, Linda Greene, Race in the Twenty-First Century: Equality Through Law?, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT 292-302 (Kim-
berl6 Crenshaw et al., eds. 1995) (discussing several key civil rights cases and the themes of
equality that they embody).
21. See Brooks, supra note 18, at 92 (discussing two models of racial justice: "sym-
metrical" and "asymmetrical").
22. See generally Greene, supra note 20.
23. Brooks, supra note 18, at 98 (discussing the experiential epistemology within
CKT and the observations of CRT proponents that "a rationalist epistemology has limited
transformative capabilities, because it does not challenge the normative values underlying
much of traditional legal scholarship.").
24. See Margaret Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Grehias: Un/masking the Self While
Un/braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 15 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1 (1994); 17
HAiv. WOMEN'S LJ. 185 (1994). (discussing author's experience as a 1L at Harvard Law
School,' where she was instructed that her perspective as a Latina was irrelevant for pur-
poses of analyzing a criminal law case involving a Latina mother who was charged with
manslaughter in connection with the death of her newborn son, and that she was to
"think like a lawyer.")
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experiences of those people who HAVE suffered and continue to suffer
oppression and injustice. Truth and knowledge are based on experience,
and this experience has a transformative power. In this sense, CRT vali-
dates an intellectual movement that has existed for a very long time. The
truth of alternative epistemologies was present, for example, in Martin
Luther King's writings, speeches and sermons."5 It is similarly present in
the writings of scholars such as Vine Deloria, Jr., who is the most widely
published Native scholar in history and although not a "critical race"
scholar, has developed a Native epistemology and voice that continue to
offer intellectual leadership to contemporary political, social and eco-
nomic issues.2
6
In summary, there are three pillars of CRT that are essential to gen-
erating transformative thought: (1) interrogating the normative basis of
the law to generate new knowledge about justice; (2) advancing a notion
of racial justice as indispensable; and (3) validating an experiential episte-
mology to understand the role and effects of law. It is this creative spirit
that is fundamental to the growth and development of CRT. CRT con-
structs an alternative reality within which to critique the existing social
and legal order. That reality is flexible enough to give rise to other strands
and themes, such as the notion of "political race'" which is explicated by
Torres and Guinier in The Miner's Canary.27 The notion of "political race"
is transformational because it is an interracial project that addresses "in-
sider/outsider" strategies as part of democratic politics. It builds on the
CRT paradigm, but also transcends that paradigm. The authors of The
Miner's Canary acknowledge that theirs is a visionary project, akin to
"magical realism"-the ability to infuse reality with a transcendent quality
that distorts the "physical and temporal" basis of reality to allow people to
28see familiar things in a completely different context. In that sense, the
change in context is pivotal because it provides the foundation to gener-
ate radically different meanings. By stepping outside standard categories,
there are new things to see about how we define and deal with racial ine-
quality, class disparities, and the notion of"discrimination." As Torres and
Guinier observe, "[g]uided by a more inclusive vision of both democracy
and justice, the political race project seeks to mobilize people initially
25. See Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., supra note 20, at 85-102 (discussing Dr. King's work as giving
rise to a "reconstructive vision of community").
26. See, e.g., VINE DELORIA, JR., FOR THIS LAND: WRITINGS ON RELIGION IN AMERICA
(1999) (comprising a number of essays by Vine Deloria critiquing the institution of relig-
ion in American society). In particular, Deloria's essays on the liberation theology
movement intersect with the themes of Dr. King's work, and offer a comparative approach
to standard critiques of the role of religion in American society.
27. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 2, at 11.
28. Id. at 22.
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around a frame of racial inequity and then move them beyond their start-
ing point."'2 9
This essay builds on the point made by Guinier and Torres and ex-
amines the relationship of justice to the law in times of political
transformation. By evaluating insights from other disciplines about the
"idealist"/"realist" divide, and then applying this discussion to a contem-
porary case study of political change, we can further understand the
important intersections that the scholarly debate within CRT has illumi-
nated.
II.T hE RELATIONSHIP OF JUSTICE TO THE LAW
In her book Transitional justice, Ruti Teitel examines how "justice" is
conceived in periods of political transition.30 Her book is primarily con-
cerned with the massive political transition that occurs when dictatorships
and totalitarian regimes are overthrown in favor of building new democ-
racies.3' However, the central quandary in such societies-how should
societies deal with their evil pasts-is also one that the United States must
engage with respect to "race relations." Similarly, as Guinier and Torres
have identified through the use of "political race," democracies are forced
to undertake institutional change in order to achieve "justice" for histori-
cally disempowered groups.3 Interestingly, Teitel discusses the conception
of justice as fraught with a divide similar to that which exists within
CRT.33 Teitel claims that in the debates about the relation of law and jus-
tice to liberalization, there are two generally competing analyses on the
relationship of law to democratic development, represented by the "real-
ist" and "idealist" perspectives.34 Both perspectives are concerned with the
relationship of law and justice to liberalization and thus are concerned
with identifying the best legal responses to encourage democracy. In other
words, both interrogate how legal acts can facilitate "transformation" of
political regimes.
According to Teitel, "political realists generally conflate the question
of why a given state action is taken with that of what response is possi-
ble."35 Very simply, they see law as a "mere product of political change"
3 6
This explains why transitional justice is a vital issue in some countries, but
not in others. The realists believe that the prevailing balance of political
29. Id. at 30.
30. RUTi G. TEITEL, TRANsrrIoNAL JUSTICE (2000).
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., GUINIER & ToRtEs , supra note 2, at 168-22 (analyzing the role of politi-
cal race in "democratic renewal").
33. TEITEL, supra note 30, at 3-9.
34. Id. at 3.
35. Id. at 3-4.
36. Id. at 3.
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power structures the "path" of the transition, and thus explains the legal
response. In comparison, Teitel notes, scholars from the "idealist perspec-
tive" address the question of transitional justice by relying on universalist
conceptions of justice.37 These scholars believe that concepts of full re-
tributive or corrective justice regarding the past are necessary precursors
to liberal change. Teitel claims that the realist/idealist divide on justice in
times of transition is "essentially a divide over the relationship of law to
politics" ,38 Under liberal theory, which dominates the discussion of inter-
national law and politics, law is commonly conceived of as "following
idealist conceptions., 39 Liberal theorists tend to negate the role of politi-
cal context, believing that higher norms of human rights law, for example,
can trigger political change.40 In comparison, the realists maintain that
law is merely a product of politics. 41 Nations "do what they can," based on
the circumstances that they face.42
According to Teitel, both accounts miss "the particular significance
of justice claims in periods of radical political change" and fail to explain
"the relation between normative responses to past injustice and a state's
prospects for liberal transformation."4 3 Both accounts fail because they are
incomplete. The realists fail because they conflate the descriptive account
of what is possible with its normative conclusions.44 The idealists fail be-
cause abstract theorizing does not account well for the relation of law and
political change, nor does it capture what is "distinctive about justice in
times of transition."45 In short, the "realist/idealist" divide, like the divide
between liberal and critical theorists, bifircates the relation of law to poli-
tics. It is necessary, Teitel argues, to move beyond these paradigms to
explore the role of the law in periods of radical political transformation. 6
Legal responses play an "extraordinary, constitutive role" in such periods.
4 7
Teitel claims that "the conception of justice in periods of political change
is extraordinary and constructivist: It is alternatively constituted by, and
constitutive of, the transition. 48 Teitel perceives the conception of justice
as "contextualized and partial."49 What is "deemed just is contingent and











48. Id. at 6.
49. Id.
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informed by prior injustice."' Teitel examines various forms of law in
different societies, directed toward "punishment, historical inquiry, repara-
tions, purges, and constitution making."5 Her ultimate conclusion is that
law is both shaped by political circumstances and itself structures the tran-
52
sition.
The focus of Teitel's work is on understanding how legal structures
operate to facilitate justice in societies that are experiencing transforma-
tive political change. In comparison, much of CRT is concerned with
understanding how legal structures operate to continue oppressive social,
political and economic conditions and to justify maintaining conditions
of "injustice" in the United States, which is, by most accounts, a "liberal,
democratic" society. 3 Teitel's work sees democratization as "justice." CRT
sees "justice" as dependent upon institutional changes within the democ-
racy.14 Both accounts question the way law is used to achieve justice. But
what does "justice" mean? As the next section of this essay demonstrates,
that question is informed by historic and contemporary contexts, as well
as the lived experience of the groups that are directly impacted by the
laws and policies at issue. In the next section, this essay analyzes the debate
over contemporary Native Hawaiian political rights in order to illustrate
the complexities and promise of transformational justice.
III.THE NATIvE HAWAIIAN CASE
A recent New York Times headline focused national attention on
the heated debate occurring in Hawaii: "Bill Giving Native Hawaiians
Sovereignty Is Too Much for Some, Too Little for Others."5 5 The article
discussed pending legislation sponsored by Hawaii's Senators Daniel
Akaka and Daniel Inouye, "The Native Hawaiian Government Reorgani-
zation Act. '5 6 The Act would formally acknowledge a political relationship
between the United States and the Native Hawaiians and lead to the crea-
tion of a governing body for Native Hawaiians similar to the tribal
councils possessed by many Native American Nations. 7 The Native Ha-
waiian governing body would then be empowered to negotiate with the
United States and state of Hawaii over portions of the vast amounts of




53. Tomms & GUNIER, supra note 2, at 34-37.
54. See GUINIER & ToRRas, supra note 2, at 168-222.
55. Dean E. Murphy, Bill Giving Native Hawaiians Sovereignty Is Too Much for Some,
Too Little for Others, N.Y TIMES, July 17, 2005, at 14.
56. See S. 147, 109th Cong.; H.R. 309, 109th Cong., "The Native Hawaiian Gov-
ernment Reorganization Act of 2005."
57. Id. at 5 4.
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19"' century.5" Because Native Hawaiians are not eligible to petition for
federal recognition on the same basis as Native American groups, the
Akaka bill sets up a process by which Native Hawaiians can achieve a
status similar, but not identical, to that enjoyed by federally recognized
Native American tribes.9 Of course, there are many challenges to the
proposal and many unanswered questions. The bill has not only generated
complaints by non-Natives who fear the creation of "special rights" for
Native Hawaiians, but it is the subject of an active debate among Native
Hawaiians themselves, which is a bit disconcerting to non-Natives, who
fail to understand why Native Hawaiians would not universally support a
bill that "gives them sovereignty."60 The Akaka bill contemplates "political
change" and purports to be a mechanism to achieve "justice" for Native
Hawaiian people. As such, it is a prime site to apply the theoretical dis-
course within political theory and critical race theory about "idealist" and
"realist" approaches to justice.
A. Historical Background
Today, the Native people of Hawaii, or Kanaka Maoli, as they refer
to themselves, are considered "Native Americans." However, this was not
always the case. The Native Hawaiians are the only indigenous group in
the United States to have maintained an independent political status un-
der international law.6' The Kingdom of Hawaii enjoyed international
status as a nation in the 19' century and was accorded full diplomatic rec-
ognition by the United States, as well as other global nations.62 The
58. Id.
59. See Price v. State of Hawaii, 764 F2d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that be-
cause a group of Native Hawaiians was not "duly recognized" by the Secretary of the
Interior as "an Indian tribe or band," the group could not maintain a cause of action for
purposes of establishing jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1362, and further noting that Na-
tive Hawaiians are expressly excluded from petitioning for federal recognition under 25
C.ER. Part 83, which prescribes the administrative requirements for American Indian
groups to petition for federal recognition).
60. Murphy, supra note 55. See also DAVID GETCHES, CHARLES WILKINSON & ROBERT
A. WILLIAMS, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 925-27 (5th ed. 2005) (summarizing the debate over
the proposed legislation).
61. In comparison, the American Indian Nations and Alaska Native Nations were
treated as "domestic dependent nations" under the fiction of the "doctrine of discovery"
which held that the first European sovereign to claim and settle lands in the New World
got the "tide" to the land, and the Native peoples retained only a "right of occupancy." See,
e.g., Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 563 (1823) (establishing the fiamework for "abo-
riginal title," also known as the Indians' "right of occupancy"); Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (extending the same analysis to Alaska Native groups).
62. See Kunani Nihipali, Stone by Stone, Bone by Bone: Rebuilding the Hawaiian Nation
in the Illusion of Reality, 34 ARIz. ST. L.J. 27,38 (2002).
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Kingdom of Hawaii entered treaties facilitating trade and commerce with
the United States, as well as other nations.6 a In 1842, the U.S. Secretary of
State, Daniel Webster, wrote that no power ought to take possession of the
islands through conquest "or for the purpose of colonization., 64 Thus, the
Kingdom of Hawaii was never subjected to the "Doctrine of Discovery"
that was used to subordinate Native American rights to land and sover-
eignty with the legal fiction that, upon discovery and settlement of lands
in the New World, the Europeans and their successors in interest (e.g. the
United States) received the full title to the land, except for the Indian's
"right of occupancy.' 61 Under this colonial doctrine, the Native American
Nations were divested of their political right to cede lands or enter politi-
cal alliances with other sovereigns.66 The sovereigns transferred title to
their successors in interest. The right of occupancy entitled the Indians to
continue their physical use and occupancy of the lands until the right was
extinguished by the sovereign through "purchase or conquest. 6 7 In com-
parison, the Kingdom of Hawaii enjoyed international political
recognition under the prevailing standards of the time. In accordance with
this status, the Kingdom was organized as a constitutional monarchy, pos-
sessed a system of recorded land titles, and had a citizenry that was
predominantly, but not exclusively, Native Hawaiian.68
Despite Webster's remarks in 1842, the United States worked hard to
establish a significant commercial and political presence on the Hawaiian
63. See Dennis Pu'uhonua "Bumpy" Kanahele, Clandestine Manipulation Toward
Genocide, 34 ARiz. ST. L.J. 63 (2002) (explaining the history of the Kingdom of Hawaii
from the perspective of a contemporary Native Hawaiian political leader); S.147, Cong.
§ 2 (2005) (affirming under its "findings" that the United States accorded full diplomatic
recognition to the Kingdom of Hawaii from 1826-93, and entered several treaties and
conventions with the Kingdom of Hawaii to govern commerce and navigation).
64. See Jennifer Chock, One Hundred Years of Illegitimacy: International Legal Analysis of
the Illegal Overthrow of the Hawaiian Monarchy, Hawaii's Annexation, and Possible Reparations,
17 U. HAw. L. Risv. 463,463 (1995).
65. See Johnson, 21 U.S. 543,574.
66. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (ChiefJustice John Mar-
shall's opinion creates the concept of a "domestic dependent nation," meaning that the
Indian nations existed as separate nations, but were so completely "under the sovereignty
and dominion of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a
political connection with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory,
and an act of hostility.").
67. Johnson, 21 U.S. 543, 587 (finding that "discovery gave an exclusive right to
extinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest").
68. See Poka Laenui, The Rediscovery of Hawaiian Sovereignty, 17(1) AM. INDIAN CUL-
TuPE AND REs.J. 79, 81 (1993) (explaining the multicultural citizenship of the Kingdom of
Hawaii); Office of Hawaiian Affairs, NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS HANDBOOK, 3-10 (Melody
Kapilialoha MacKenzie ed. 1991) (explaining the history of the Hawaiian land tenure
system).
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Islands. 69 By the 1880s, some Americans were convinced that this presence
justified treating Hawaii as a "possession" of the United States, although
there was no legal basis to do so. The citizens of the Kingdom of Hawaii
resisted any attempt to place themselves under the sovereignty of the
United States. In 1893, a group of American insurgents, with the help of
the U.S. military, seized control of the Kingdom of Hawaii.70 Queen Lil-
iuokalani issued a conditional and temporary surrender until such time as
the United States should honor its treaty obligations and reinstate her as
the constitutional sovereign of the Hawaiian islands.71 President Grover
Cleveland established a Commission to look into the issue. The Commis-
sion verified that the overthrow was accomplished by the use of
"American military intervention against the will of a majority of Hawai-
ian citizens, in violation of international law as well as American foreign
policy. President Cleveland recommended to Congress that it reinstate
the Queen. Cleveland found that if a weak but "friendly state" is in dan-
ger of being robbed of its independence and sovereignty by an abuse of
power, the U.S. should vindicate its honor and sense ofjustice "by an ear-
nest attempt to make all possible reparations.
'73
Not surprisingly, given the strategic location of the Hawaiian Islands,
as well as the commercial value of the industry in the islands, Congress
neglected to follow the recommendation. Ultimately, Hawaii was annexed
into the United States by the Newlands Joint Resolution of 1898, after an
Annexation Treaty failed to pass the Senate. 4 The annexation of the "Re-
public of Hawaii" occurred without the consent of the Hawaiian people
(they could not vote unless they took an oath of loyalty to the Provisional
government) and without the political support of the Hawaiian people,
who refused to consider the Republic of Hawaii a legitimate government,
given that it received its authority through an illegal military coup.75 In
addition, it was unclear that the U.S. Constitution even sanctioned an-
nexation by joint resolution rather than treaty.6 Despite these obstacles,
Hawaii was ultimately admitted to statehood in 1959, purportedly "cur-
69. See THOMAS J. OSBORNE, ANNEXATION HAWAII: FIGHTING AMERICAN IMPERIALISM
(1998); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAII: THE CULTURAL POWER OF LAW (2000);
Office of Hawaii Affairs, supra note 68, at 10-15. (Explaining the history and current im-
portance of the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy and annexation of Hawaii as one of
the United States).
70. See Office of Hawaiian Affairs, supra note 68, at 12.
71. Laenui, supra note 68, at 86.
72. See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. PEv. 323,370 (1987).
73. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, supra note 68, at 12; see also Chock, supra note 64, at
466 n. 28 (1995).
74. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, supra note 68, at 15.
75. See Laenui, supra note 68, at 89.
76. See OSBORNE, supra note 69, at 112.
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ing" all of the egregious legal, moral, and political issues attendant to the
71original annexation.
B. Contemporary Politics
At this point, did the Native Hawaiians become just another group
of indigenous peoples occupying lands that were "conquered" by the
United States? Unlike the Native American Nations, the U.S. government
did not act to establish an exclusive trust relationship with the Native
Hawaiians.7" The Kingdom of Hawaii held substantial lands in trust for the
Hawaiian people. 79 These lands were transferred to the United States as
"ceded lands." t Some of the land was retained in federal ownership for
military and national park use.81 The remainder was transferred to the state
of Hawaii, which agreed to hold the land in trust, with part of the pro-
ceeds directed toward assisting the Native people."' The federal
government had already passed legislation in 1921 that created the Native
Hawaiian Homes Commission, which undertook to distribute small par-
cels of land under long-term leases to Native Hawaiians of at least 50%
blood8 3 Upon statehood, this program was also transferred to the state to
manage.84 Very few Native Hawaiians ever received homesteads. Although
the state ultimately created an agency just to deal with Native Hawaiian
issues, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), Native Hawaiians are bene-
ficiaries of only a fraction of the value gained from ceded lands and their
77. See Laenui, supra note 68, at 92.
78. S. 147, 5 2(20)(A), (C)(2005) (acknowledging that the United States has a special
responsibility for the welfare of the native peoples of the United States, including Native
Hawaiians, but also recognizing that the United States has delegated broad authority to the
State of Hawaii to administer some of its responsibilities as they relate to the Native Ha-
waiian people and their lands). In comparison, the federal courts have held that state
power over Indian tribes and lands is generally preempted by the exclusive federal trust
relationship. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832) (holding that the state of
Georgia could not extend its laws over the Cherokee Nation, except with "the assent of
the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress"
because state power over Indian tribes and lands is generally preempted by the exclusive
federal trust relationship).
79. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, supra note 68, at 10, 16 (describing the legal status of
the "Crown lands" of the Kingdom of Hawaii prior to and after annexation).
80. See Brian Duus, Reconciliation Between the United States and Native Hawaiians: The
Duty of the United States to Recognize a Native Hawaiian Nation and Settle the Ceded Lands
Dispute, AsiAN-PAc. L. & POL'Y J. 469, 483 (2003) (discussing the history of the "ceded
lands").
81. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, supra note 68, at 18.
82. Id. at 18-19 (noting that section 5(o of the Admission Act requires the state of
Hawaii to hold all ceded lands in trust, and details five permissible purposes for the trust,
one of which is "for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians").
83. Id. at 17.
84. Id. at 18.
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associated resources. 5 There is still a great deal of legal uncertainty over
86
the rights to and status of these lands and resources.
Today, Native Hawaiians seek redress for the overthrow of the Ha-
waiian government, as well as for the loss of land, and mismanagement of
trust assets.87 They consider themselves to be a separate people with po-
litical as well as cultural rights.88 However, their political status is
ambiguous because of the very different historical context that has shaped
the current situation.
Are Native Hawaiians members of a "nation," a "domestic depend-
ent nation," or a group of "multicultural" and "multiracial" U.S. citizens?
And why does it matter? What legal frameworks govern these issues?
What is the social context of the dispute? The Akaka Bill is only part of
the contemporary picture.
Several important legal and political developments have affected Na-
tive Hawaiians in recent years. In a 1993 Joint Resolution, Congress
acknowledged the complicity of the U.S. in the overthrow of the Hawai-
ian monarchy and apologized to the Native Hawaiian people on behalf of
the U.S.8 9 Congress was careful to note that nothing in the apology
should be read as a "settlement of claims," nor would the enactment itself
result in any change in the law.90 However, the Apology Bill calls for a
"reconciliation" between Native Hawaiians and the United States.91
Ultimately, this bid for "reconciliation" became the impetus for the
Akaka bill. The Akaka bill has been through several versions. Its primary
function is to grant the Native Hawaiians the right to organize a govern-
ment that would be recognized by the United States in a manner similar
to a Native American tribal council.92 The Indian Reorganization Act,
which was passed in 1934 to prompt tribal governments to adopt aWest-
ern model of governance and supplant traditional Native governments, is
the template for the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act.
93
85. Id. at 19-20.
86. See generally Duus, supra note 80, at 485-89 (discussing the many unresolved
issues with the ceded lands trust).
87. Matsuda, supra note 72, at 371.
88. See generally Laenui, supra note 68.
89. Sj. Res. 19, Cong., (1993) (apology resolution).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See S. 147, § 4(b) ("The purpose of this Act is to provide a process for the reor-
ganization of the Native Hawaiian governing entity and the reaffirmation of the political
and legal relationship between the United States and the Native Hawaiian governing en-
tity for purposes of continuing a government-to-government relationship.").
93. The Indian Reorganization Act was intended to promote tribes to organize
under a Western model for purposes of self-governance and thereby promote democratic
values and economic self-sufficiency. For a general description of the Indian Reorganiza-
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The Kingdom of Hawaii had accomplished political unification of the
traditional island governments; however, today there are many political
factions among the Native Hawaiian people. 4 Thus, the United States has
an interest in creating a unitary government body that can negotiate with
respect to lands and resources. This will be the function of the Native
Hawaiian governing entity. Interestingly, the Akaka bill does not attempt
to define the ultimate parameters of Native land rights or jurisdiction (it
does not, for example, attempt to create a reservation or land trust base),
which makes this legislation quite different from comparable federal rec-
ognition legislation for Native American tribes. Nor does the Bill grant
Native Hawaiians an entitlement to participate in all programs developed
for Native Americans and Alaska Natives; instead, Congress can selectively
include Native Hawaiians or not. The Bill contemplates a federal adminis-
trative apparatus, but is not specific about the budget or authority of such
an entity.95
Senator Akaka maintains that passage of the Bill is a necessary step
toward reconciliation. 6 Many Native Hawaiian people support passage of
the Bill and see it as a positive step toward the ultimate restoration of self-
government and land rights.97 Many of these supporters express fear that
if they do not endorse the legislation, the few remaining "entitlements"
that Native Hawaiian people enjoy will cease as a result of legal challenges
filed by non-Natives. 8 There is a great deal of justification for that fear. In
2000, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Rice v. Cayetano that a state-
sanctioned restriction allowing only Native Hawaiians to vote for the
OHA Board of Trustees was unconstitutional under the Fifteenth
Amendment.99 In Rice, a non-Native brought suit against the Governor of
Hawaii claiming that his exclusion from voting for OHA trustees and
from a special election on Native sovereignty violated the Fifteenth
Amendment of the Constitution.1°° The state argued that OHA had a fi-
duciary responsibility to the Native Hawaiian people to manage the assets
on their behalf, and this duty justified restricting the election of the trus-
tees to voters with Native ancestry.1 Additionally, the state argued the
classification was political in nature--similar to an Indian tribe--and was
tion Act of 1934, see Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934,70 MICH. L. REV. 955, (1972).
94. See Murphy, supra note 55.
95. S. 147, 109th Cong., § 5 (which would establish the "United States Office for
Native Hawaiian Relations" within the Office of the Secretary of Interior).
96. See Murphy, supra note 55.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. 528 U.S. 495,524 (2000).
100. Id. at 499.
101. Id. at 523.
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not "racial." 10 2 A majority of the Court disagreed, finding that the classifi-
cation was based on ancestry, and as such, was a "proxy for race."'0 3
Because OHA is a state agency, the Court found, its elections were sub-
ject to the Fifteenth Amendment. 0 4 The Court then held that the
Fifteenth Amendment invalidates any electoral qualification based on an-
cestry.10s
Throughout the opinion, the Court refers to the multicultural na-
ture of the citizenry of Hawaii and the fact that all "citizens," regardless of
race, have an interest in selecting officials who can develop policies on
their behalf, even if the policies will affect some groups more than oth-
ers. 1 6 The concluding paragraph of the majority opinion is quite telling:
When the culture and way of life of a people are all but en-
gulfed by a history beyond their control, their sense of loss may
extend down through generations; and their dismay may be
shared by many members of the larger community. As the State
of Hawaii attempts to address these realities, it must, as always,
seek the political consensus that begins with a sense of shared
purpose. One of the necessary beginning points is this princi-
ple:The Constitution of the United States, too, has become the
heritage of all the citizens of Hawaii.' 7
Although the equal protection question was not addressed in Rice,
the decision highlights many problematic issues that could be raised with
respect to other programs and entitlements that are directed toward the
Native Hawaiian people. '°8
A recent opinion from the Ninth Circuit foreshadows the further
erosion of Native Hawaiian rights. Doe v. Kamehameha Schools involved a
challenge by a non-Native student who was denied admission to the
Kamehameha Schools because he was not of Native Hawaiian ancestry.109
The Kamehameha Schools are private, nonsectarian, and commercially
operated schools that were created in the late 19"' century under a chari-
table testamentary trust established by Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop,
who was a direct descendant of the famous Hawaiian King Kamehameha
102. Id. at 517-22.
103. Id. at 514.
104. Id. at 520.
105. Id. at 523.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 524.
108. S. 147, Sec. 2(16)(A). The pending legislation lists several programs that are or
could be directed toward Native Hawaiian beneficiaries, including language immersion
programs, health care services, employment and training programs, educational programs,
conservation programs, and various educational programs.
109. Doe v. Kamehameha Schools, 416 E3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005).
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IL1O The Schools do not receive federal funding." Princess Pauahi ex-
pressed her wish to establish the schools and also directed part of the
trust's funding to support disadvantaged Native Hawaiians." 2 The Schools
trustees interpreted her words to offer a preference to qualified Native
Hawaiians."' If there are no qualified Native Hawaiians, then qualified
non-Natives can be admitted."' Thus, while the Schools do not bar non-
Natives from attendance, they accord a preference to Natives.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Kamehameha Schools' preference
was a violation of federal civil rights legislation because it constituted "in-
vidious discrimination.""' In a lengthy and complex opinion, the court
notes that the Schools admit that its preference is "racial" in nature." 6 The
Schools' attorneys did not make the argument that this was a "political"
classification, based on the reasoning in Morton v. Mancari, which sup-
ports the federal government's authority to create "special" programs and
benefits for Native American and Alaska Native groups."" Nor did the
Schools attempt to justify its policy by appealing to a First Amendment
right to freedom of association. "9 Because the court found that the policy
is racially discriminatory, it applied a heightened standard of scrutiny, but
because there is no state action, the court did not apply the 14'h Amend-
ment equal protection standard of"strict scrutiny."'2 Rather, it applied the
"more deferential" form of scrutiny applied to resolve challenges brought
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.121 Using this stan-
dard, the court found that the plaintiff student had established a prima
facie case of intentional racial discrimination. 22 The burden then shifted
to the defendant to demonstrate a "legitimate nondiscriminatory reason"
justifying the challenged practice. 23 The Schools alleged that its policy
was a "valid affirmative action plan" rationally related to redressing present
imbalances in the socioeconomic and educational achievement of Native
110. Id. at 1027.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1028.
113. Id. at 1029.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1027 (holding that the Schools admissions policy constitutes "unlawful
race discrimination" in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981).
116. Id. at 1029.
117. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (upholding an Indian employment
preference in the Bureau of Indian Affairs under a rational basis test, on the basis that the
"Indian" classification was politically, and not racially, based).
118. Id.
119. Kamehameha Schools, 528 U.S. at 1027.
120. Id. at 1038.
121. Id. at 1038-39.
122. Id. at 1039.
123. Id. at 1039-40.
FALL 2005]
Michigan journal of Race & Law
Hawaiians and designed to produce Native Hawaiian leadership and revi-
talize Native culture.
124
The court found the defendants had not met their burden.125 The
court relied on the Weber test, which determines when affirmative action
plans are valid. The court found that the Schools policy violated the sec-
ond prong of that test, which is whether it "creates an absolute bar to the
advancement of the non-preferred race or unnecessarily trammels their
rights. 1 26 The court found that the Kamehameha preference operated as
an absolute bar to admission for non-Hawaiians and "unnecessarily tram-
meled their rights" because the denials were purely a product of race.
Absolute classifications based on race "threaten to stigmatize individuals
by reason of their membership in a racial group and ... incite racial hos-
tility.''127 Thus, the "absolute bar to admission on the basis of race is
invalid.'0
2
It is ironic that both Rice v. Cayetano and Doe v. Kamehameha Schools
award rights to White people using constitutional and civil rights doc-
trines that were intended to help minority groups achieve parity with the
dominant society and redress their historic exclusion. In each case, the
White plaintiff is seeking to share some benefit that has been awarded to
Native people to redress a history of injustice. However, under the analysis
of both courts, times have changed. Now we are a society committed to
"equality," and Natives cannot discriminate against non-Natives. The
Akaka bill purports to provide a federal basis for the "special treatment,"
analogous to the doctrines that have developed to protect Native Ameri-
can and Alaska Native rights.2 9 Will the Akaka bill solve the problem?
The jury is out on that question because it is not clear that Congress has
the same authority to enact such legislation for Native Hawaiians under
the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution as it does for Indian
tribes.' 30 The Commerce Clause gives Congress the sole and exclusive
authority to regulate trade with Indian tribes. The federal government
claims that the provision extends to Native Hawaiians on the theory that
they are "indigenous peoples," just like Indians are "indigenous peoples,"
124. Id. at 1040.
125. Id. at 1041.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1042.
128. Id.
129. See S. 147, 109th Cong. (2005).
130. See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The
Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE LJ. 537, 561-62 (1996) (arguing the federal govern-
ment's Commerce Clause authority to regulate trade with "Indian tribes" does not extend
to Native Hawaiians).
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and this makes them eligible for special protection."' There is authority
for that position with respect to groups such as the Pueblos in New Mex-
ico, which were annexed into the U.S. after they had already received land
grants from Spain and were "citizens" of Mexico, but were nonetheless
"Indians in character and custom" and thus were held to be subject to the
special protection and authority of the United States. 32 However, the
Kingdom of Hawaii enjoyed international recognition, which makes Na-
tive Hawaiians unique among all indigenous groups now in the United
States.
This fact inspires some Native Hawaiians to resist the Akaka bill.
133
The proponents of Hawaiian independence claim that the Kingdom of
Hawaii was overthrown in an illegal military coup, and was annexed into
the United States in violation of both international law and domestic
constitutional law. They claim that because the citizens of the Kingdom
of Hawaii never consented to the annexation, Hawaii is a country under
military domination and justice requires that they be accorded a right of
self-deterrmnation.3 They claim that it is a firther violation of their
rights to offer them the subordinate status of "domestic dependent na-
tion" like an Indian tribe, when they are in reality a Nation.
136
The political controversy over the Akaka bill raises many interesting
issues, which have yet to be resolved. Even if the Akaka bill is enacted into
law, it is possible that a future claimant will file a legal attack questioning
Congress authority to pass this legislation. For purposes of this essay, how-
ever, the politics of this case study merit analysis under the CRT
frameworks that have been developed.
IV. RACIAL HEALING AND THE ROLE OF
TRANSFORMATIONAL THOUGHT
In his book, Interracial Justice, Eric Yamamoto evaluates racial healing
by examining some of the most daunting racial conflicts in our history.
His book also explores the struggle of communities of color to engage
each other and the dominant society, and to heal the wounds caused by
131. See S. 147, § 2(1) (finding "the Constitution vests Congress with the authority
to address the conditions of the indigenous native people of the United States"; see also
S.147, 5 2(2) (finding that "Native Hawaiians ... are indigenous native people of the
United States").
132. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913) (holding the Pueblo lands
were "Indian Country," subject to federal regulation, because the Pueblos were "Indians"
for purposes of federal law).
133. See Kanehele, supra note 63, at 67-68; see also Nihipali, supra note 62, at 42-44.
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these conflicts."' This is a transformative account of interracial healing
and interracial justice; one that depends upon a rich understanding of
discourse, as well as the material articulation of rights within our legal
structure. In an earlier article titled "Race Apologies," Professor Yama-
moto noted the interdependency of the idealist and materialist
perspectives, observing that:
reconciliation through framing of a new societal narrative re-
quires more than survivor storytelling and incomplete
apologies.When those suffering see material change in societal
attitudes and institutional structures, when some form of
meaningful reparations is forthcoming, then ... those disen-
franchised may sense a kind ofjustice that contributes to inter-
group healing.1
38
The upshot of this perspective is to note that idealist and materialist
frameworks are essential to the type of restructuring that will be necessary
to accomplish "racial healing." There is no "one size fits all." In line with
Teitel's work, which conceptualizes justice as "extraordinary" and "consti-
tutive of transformation," the role of justice is to transcend the binary
categories that currently structure our debates. 139 The three central pillars
of CRT enable this discussion to occur. CRT offers a conceptual frame-
work to gain knowledge about injustice, to create concepts of racial
"equality" that address the historical or contemporary forms of injustice,
and to generate epistemologies that have the capacity to create structures
that may currently be outside of our "reality."1 40 However, those structures
may one day constitute our "reality" if we work at the higher level of pos-
sibility.
I will conclude this essay by suggesting how that process of envi-
sioning might work in Hawaii. Today, the Native Hawaiian people are
being told that they have a choice. First, they can "assimilate" into the
"multicultural" citizenry of Hawaii as a state within the U.S. The majority
in Rice sees this as the preferred solution because the Constitution is the
"common heritage" of all citizens. T4 The dominant society would see this
as a satisfactory solution. Justice is accomplished through "equality" as
citizens. Non-natives and Natives are treated "alike." They are protected
by the Constitution. The history of the Kingdom of Hawaii is, under this
view, irrelevant. It is a nice memory, but the Native Hawaiian people can-
137. ERIc YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-
CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA (1999).
138. EricYamamoto, Race Apologies, 1J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 47, 67 (1997).
139. TA1TEL, supra note 30, at 4.
140. See discussion supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
141. 528 U.S. at 524.
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not stay in their "past." They must move ahead to be part of "America"'
just like all the other ethnic and immigrant groups. The Ninth Circuit's
analysis in Kamehameha Schools continues this logic. Native Hawaiians may
still suffer from social inequity, the Court finds, but they cannot use ra-
cially discriminatory methods to equalize themselves because this
disadvantages non-Natives. Again, all "citizens" must be treated alike un-
der the U.S. civil rights laws.
The second choice being posed to Native Hawaiians under the aus-
pices of the Akaka bill is to have a separate political status as a form of
"domestic dependent nation."1 42 The United States has committed itself to
this model by developing the jurisprudence of Federal Indian law, which
centers around the "political" rather than "racial" status of federally-
recognized Native American and Alaska Native peoples. This political
status is used to justify federal programs that are directed to the benefit of
federally-recognized Native groups. Indians who lack federal recognition
do not share this status, and it is unclear whether there is even a satisfac-
tory racial category for those people. In many ways, their cultural or
ethnic identity is truly irrelevant. For legal purposes, they are most often
treated the same as White people. 4 3 The United States cannot claim that
the Native Hawaiians did not have a separate political status, nor can it
claim that the United States has not recognized a special relationship and
obligation through federal enactments such as the Hawaiian Homes
Commission Act'1 and the Apology Resolution.' 4 The United States also
recognizes that there are serious legal problems over ownership of certain
lands and resources as a result of this distinctive history; therefore, the best
solution from the perspective of the United States is to treat Native Ha-
waiians like Indians--or at least in a similar manner. This is arguably
consistent with federal law (assuming that the Indian Commerce Clause
applies to Native Hawaiians) and emerging international human rights
norms which specify that indigenous peoples' rights to land, resources,
and culture ought to be respected under domestic law.146 So, is the Akaka
bill a satisfactory way to achieve "justice" for Native Hawaiians? Will it
lead toward "reconciliation" (which presumably entails racial healing)?
And, perhaps most important of all, are these two "solutions" truly the
only possibilities?
In evaluating these questions, let us first look at the role of CRT in
generating knowledge about the nature of "injustice." Eric Yamamoto's
142. S. 147, 109th Cong. (2005).
143. See ROBERT E. CLINTON, CAROLE E. GOLDBERG AND REBEccA TSOSIE, AMERICAN
INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 120-23 (4th ed. 2003)(noting the
legal distinctions among Indian Tribes based on "federal recognition").
144. Act ofJuly 9,1921, Pub. L. No. 34, 42., 42 Stat. 108.
145. S.J. Res. 19, 103d Cong. 107 Stat. 1510 (1993).
146. See generally S.JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996)
(examining the role of international law in protecting the rights of indigenous peoples).
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book contains an entire chapter devoted to the history of the reparations
movement in Hawaii and the role of the Christian Churches. 147 It is a fas-
cinating story that describes the dialogue and the feelings that were
expressed between Church leaders and Native leaders, and indeed, among
Church leaders who are also Native Hawaiians. That dialogue is emo-
tional, evoking the deep spiritual wounds occasioned by this history of
injustice. 14 There are other relevant dialogues, of course. The dialogue
about the significance of the Kingdom of Hawaii and the political and
legal history of the Kanaka Maoli is told in a variety of forums, including
sites where Independence leaders have made political statements and
taken the activist road to protest conditions of injustice.149 There is also a
dialogue among Native Hawaiians who continue to protest the develop-
ment of sacred sites, the desecration of burial sites, and a host of other
cultural concerns."0 These dialogues elicit the truth that is filly present in
the contemporary lives of Native Hawaiian people: Native Hawaiians
ARE a distinctive people with a separate political and cultural identity. In
many ways, non-Natives have appropriated parts of this identity (the Hula,
Lomi Lomi, etc.) in order to carve out a separate identity for the State of
Hawaii that will appeal to tourists.' However, the original identity of the
Hawaiian people continues on. It is expressed in their language, in par-
ticular places, in ceremonies, in the recounting of genealogies and
histories. It is present and it is alive. This work, which might be called
"discourse analysis" is fundamental to eliciting the truth of who the Na-
tive Hawaiian people really are. They are not "Indians." They are not
merely "indigenous peoples." They are the Kanaka Maoli and they are the
contemporary descendants of the Kingdom of Hawaii, which never vol-
untarily surrendered to the United States.
Now, what do we DO with that truth? Can we construct an alter-
native reality? Kunani Nihipali speaks of living in the "illusion of reality"
in which the only options that are offered to the Hawaiian people are
those that would serve the interests of the very country that sits in
wrongful occupation of the Hawaiian islands. 1 2 Hawaiian leaders such as
Nihipali and Kanahele are committed to independence, to reinstating the
Nation of Hawaii as co-equal with the United States, and NOT as a "de-
147. YAMAMOTO, supra note 137, at 210-35.
148. Id. at 212.
149. See Kanahele, supra note 63, at 70.
150. Nihipali, supra note 62 (offering a detailed account of the work undertaken by
Hui Malama in service of the ancestors and the culture that have enabled the survival of
the Hawaiian people).
151. See HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND SOVER-
EIGNTY IN HAWAII, 2-3, 17 (1993).
152. Nihipali, supra note 62, at 38, 44.
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pendent" of the United States. 1 3 Political equality, under this analysis, re-
quires equality of Nations, and not equality of citizens. Nihipali describes
the Akaka bill as "an example of how structures and strategies of domina-
tion created under colonialism are transferred and re-deployed by the
formerly colonized to make us indistinguishable from the rest of Ameri-
can society. It is a self-colonizing assimilation tool which, if allowed to
continue, could inevitably lead to our extinction.' ,11 4 Examining the con-
cept of justice through the CRT lens of "equality" demands that we
consider the notion of "equality of nations" as a possibility to achieve jus-
tice for and reconciliation with the Native Hawaiian people.Within CRT
frameworks, we are aware that formal equality, as a matter of constitu-
tional and civil rights law, can and often does disadvantage people of color
and benefit the dominant society.' CRT enables us to transcend formal
equality and, building on the truth of the political, social, economic and
spiritual conditions experienced by a people, to analyze alternative possi-
bilities to achieve justice.
Finally, let us look at how alternative epistemologies can be em-
ployed to create those possibilities. In undertaking this analysis, I will draw
on a work that I co-authored a few years ago with Wallace Coffey on the
topic of "Cultural Sovereignty" which was inspired by the need for trans-
formative thought within Federal Indian law.'16 As most of us know, the
political and legal construction of Native sovereignty in the U.S. is quite
far removed from the notion of tribal sovereignty that exists in the hearts
and minds of Native people. Within Federal Indian Law, tribal govern-
ments are considered "domestic dependent nations," which is a status that
is definitely NOT equal to other nations.5 7 Thus, Indian tribes, unlike
European nations, were considered to have only a "right to occupancy,"
and not the territorial rights of a "real" nation.5 18 Furthermore, because
they were perceived to be in a rudimentary state of governance, they were
deemed to be "wards" of the federal government, which had a "guardian-
ship" role that ensured its superior power.5 9 Over the years, this status has
been associated with diminished jurisdictional rights. Cases such as Ol-
iphant v. Suquamish Tribe, Montana v. United States, and Strate v. A-1
153. Id. at 44 (discussing the process of reviving the Hawaiian nation as one that is
both spiritual and political in nature).
154. Id. at 44.
155. See, e.g., Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property in CRITIcAL RACE THEORY, supra
note 20, at 287.
156. See Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine:
Cultural Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations, 12 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 191
(2001).
157. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (distinguishing "domestic de-
pendent nations" from "foreign nations").
158. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 574.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) ("Indian tribes
are the wards of the nation.They are communities dependent on the United States.").
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Contractors term Indian nations to have a sort of "quasi-sovereign status"
when they regulate their own tribal relations; however, their sovereignty is
"diminished" by the overriding sovereignty of the U.S., and to the extent
that they attempt to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indian citizens, they
do not exercise the full range of sovereign powers that other nations (or
even states) would enjoy.1 60 The notion that Indian nations are not fully
socialized or civilized also creeps into these cases, masked as a fear that




These notions support the location of privilege and power in the
federal government, sometimes in the state governments, but definitely
not with the tribal governments. The ensuing problems, such as lack of
any meaningful tribal jurisdiction over assaults and domestic violence be-
tween non-Indians and Indians, are treated as a "social condition,"
amenable perhaps for federal funding to "study" the problem. But no one
seriously questions the validity of the basic structure. After all, everyone
knows that tribes are not "really" sovereigns, right? And, haven't they al-
ways been subject to these doctrines?
The answer, quite simply, is "no." We have been socialized and con-
ditioned to accept this status as the "reality" of things. But, it is NOT.
How many of us remember a time before any European peoples arrived?
The oral histories of Native peoples tell about that time. How many of us
remember the time when the Europeans came crawling to tribal leaders
for their support and protection against enemy groups-both Native and
non-Native? The first treaties between the U.S. and the Native Nations
tell that story, such as the 1778 Treaty of Ft. Pitt with the Delaware Na-
tion, in which the U.S. officials begged the Delaware leaders to have "safe
passage" through "their country" and also begged for military assistance
from Delaware warriors against the evil King of England. 62 Who were the
"Americans" at that time? Did they think they had the "right" to claim
title to Native land? NO. Did they think they had the right to disinter
Native remains and cart them off to museums and laboratories? No. Did
they think that they had the right to unilaterally command the Delawares
to obey their laws? NO, no, and no. The Seneca Treaty of Canandaigua is
160. See Strate v.A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,459 (1997) (holding that tribal court
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a tort lawsuit between two non-Indians that arose on the
reservation); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (holding that Indian
tribe was implicitly divested from authority to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on
fee lands within the reservation); Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208-09
(1978) (holding that Indian tribes have been implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians who commit crimes on the reservation).
161. See e.g., Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 210 (discussing the interest of the federal govern-
ment in ensuring that non-Indian citizens are protected against "unwarranted intrusions
on their personal liberty").
162. CLINrON, ETr A., supra note 143, at 4-5.
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to the same effect. 163 These were treaties between NATIONS, engaged in
a spirit of diplomacy.
So, what happened? That is much too complex to engage within the
space of this essay. But, a big part of what happened is that Native people
started to believe that this is the way things always were. We could blame
the boarding schools and other forcible assimilation programs; we could
blame genocide and forced dependency for the resultant scars that cut
deep into Native communities today. And, of course, that is all true. But,
don't we have to take the responsibility to envision our own reality? That
is the promise of what Comanche tribal leader, Wallace Coffey, and I
wrote about in our article on "Cultural Sovereignty." Cultural sovereignty,
we said, "is the effort of Indian nations and Indian people to exercise their
own norms and values in structuring their collective futures."' 164 If the
U.S. Supreme Court dares to define Native sovereignty as "subject to
complete defeasance" by the United States, then it is up to us to assert
that inherent sovereignty is NOT dependent upon any grant, gift, or ac-
knowledgment by the U.S. government. 165 Inherent tribal sovereignty
preexists the arrival of the European people and the formation of the U.S.
It is up to Native people to define, assert, protect, and insist upon respect
for the right to be what they have always been: distinctive governments
and societies, autonomous and free. But we first have to resist the colonial
enterprise, which uses external power to define the "other" as subordinate
to the colonial nation.1 66 We have to take back our power and construct
tribal sovereignty from WITHIN Native societies.
It strikes me that this is exactly what is happening right now in Ha-
waii. According to the New York Times article, the Akaka bill would
"grant" Native Hawaiians "sovereignty.' 6 7 This is a dangerous statement
for two reasons. First, the United States cannot "grant" sovereignty. Inher-
ent sovereignty comes from within; it is retained by the people. It is an
attribute of a people that maintain their own government, their own set
of laws, and exist within their own territory. The U.S. Supreme Court is
getting close to deciding if tribes in fact DO have inherent sovereignty.
In United States v. Lara, Justice Thomas wrote a separate opinion declaring
the Supreme Court must decide once and for all if tribal sovereignty is
subject to complete defeasance, as the Court has said, through the exercise
163. See generally G. PETER JEMISON & ANNA M. SCHEIN, TREATY OF CANANDAIGUA
1794: 200 YEARS OF TREATY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY AND THE
UNITED STATES (2000) (describing the historical background and contemporary relevance
of the Treaty of Canandaigua).
164. Coffey &Tsosie, supra note 156, at 196.
165. Id. at 194-95 (quoting United States v.Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,323 (1978)).
166. See generally Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34
Asuz. ST. L.J. 75 (2002) (giving an account of Native sovereignty that starts with indige-
nous understandings).
167. See Murphy, supra note 55.
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of plenary power. 8 If it is, he claims, tribes are NOT sovereigns and the
doctrine of "inherent or retained sovereignty" is a fiction. At that point,
tribes would then be merely self-governing administrative units of the
federal government, as the dissenting justices in Lara maintained.169 Sec-
ondly, the Native Hawaiian people do not need the federal government to
grant them sovereignty. If they have maintained their political identity,
they have maintained their sovereignty. What the Native Hawaiian people
need is for the United States to recognize that sovereignty on terms that
are acceptable. The status of "equal citizen" is unacceptable because it ne-
gates the political identity of the Native Hawaiian people. The status of
domestic dependent nation is acceptable to some Hawaiian people be-
cause it ensures some separate political status and unacceptable to others170
because of the reliance on dependency. The status of "nation" is accept-
able to proponents of independence, but is probably unacceptable to the
United States because it has a huge reliance on the value of the Hawaiian
islands for commercial, economic and military purposes. Are there other
possibilities?
At least one other possibility has been raised: the idea of "free asso-
ciation" through a compact between the Nation of Hawaii and the
United States. 171 The Nation of Hawaii would be on the road to full inde-
pendence, but would contract with the United States for a structured
relationship over many years that would meet the needs of both parties.
This is the type of relationship that the Nation of Palau enjoys with the
United States, and it is a model for other nations in the South Pacific.
172
That model may be more culturally consistent with the political and his-
torical reality of Hawaii than the Native American tribal governance
model.
Finally, it may be possible to look at what is happening in Canada
with the new territory of Nunuvut. 173 This is a distinctively Inuit territory,
although it is constituted as a province of Canada. The character of
Nunuvut, which is predominantly Native, allows for new forms of terri-
torial, language, and educational rights. Nunuvut's laws are distinctive and
designed to enable indigenous self-determination within a domestic, de-
168. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 214 (2004) (opinion ofThomas,J.).
169. Id. at 226 (SouterJ. and Scalia,J., dissenting).
170. See Nihipali, supra note 62, at 44.
171. See also Cross-Cutting Themes in Hawaii: Native Hawaiian Rights, Perceived Racial
Differences, and the Desire to Restore Hawaiian Sovereignty, NARF LEGAL REVIEW, vol. 28,
no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2003) (outlining possibilities for self-determination for Native Ha-
waiian people under the models of free association that are applicable to other trust
territories in the Pacific Islands).
172. id.
173. See generally Thomas Isaac, The Nunavut Agreement-In-Principle and Section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982,21 MANITOBA L.J. 390 (1992).
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mocratic participatory structure.1 7 4 This is not an independent nation
model, and the status of the Inuit people is far more similar to the Native
Alaskan groups than to the Native Hawaiians. So, it may not be a possibil-
ity at all. Yet, it is another example of how contemporary governments
can craft new and creative models to fit the cultural and political character
of Native peoples within their borders.
CONCLUSION
I was deeply honored to participate in this Symposium with scholars
who I recognize and admire as leaders in the area of Critical Race The-
ory. In particular, I am intrigued by two thoughts raised by Richard
Delgado in the opening Keynote address. 7 ' He referred to a process of
"psychic healing" that occurs when people begin to recognize that their
oppressed condition is not their fault. We have not given sufficient atten-
tion to the process of "self-healing," and this is another place that CRT
can accomplish important work. I am reminded of Assistant Secretary
Kevin Gover's apology for the past bad acts of the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs toward Native American people, including forcible assimilation,
forced dependency, and outright physical genocide. 176 In that apology
speech, Assistant Secretary Gover, a member of the Pawnee Tribe, ac-
knowledged that the intergenerational harm of those misdeeds continues
to haunt Native people, and manifests in Native communities in various
negative ways:
The trauma of shame, fear, and anger has passed from one gen-
eration to the next, and manifests itself in the rampant
alcoholism, drug abuse, and domestic violence that plague In-
dian country. Many of our people live lives of unrelenting
tragedy as Indian families suffer the ruin of lives by alcoholism,
suicides made of shame and despair, and violent death at the
hands of one another.
17
Assistant Secretary Gover's apology was intended, on a spiritual level,
to set in motion a process of self-healing, by acknowledging the truth
about what happened, redirecting blame, healing spiritual trauma, and
promoting a sense of collective responsibility on the part of the U.S. gov-
ernment for this history. In many ways, this approach reflects Native
174. Id.
175. Richard Delgado, Keynote Address at the Michigan Journal of Race and Law
Symposium, Going Back to Class: The Reemergence of Class in Critical Race Theory (February
5, 2005) (hereinafter Keynote Address).
176. Congressional Record, 106th Cong. 2d. Sess., 2000. Vol. 146, pt. E 1453-03
(Sept. 8, 2000) (comments of Kevin Gover).
177. Id.
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cultural views that associate "justice" with healing. 17 For example, the
peacemaking traditions of the Navajo people emphasize the need to re-
store group harmony when individuals have harmed others. 179 This is
accomplished through the use of songs, stories, and rituals that remind
individuals of the appropriate norms that were set in place long ago to
ensure a good life for the Dine people.8 ° As Eric Yamamoto observes, the
focus in such a system "is not on fault but on why the people are in dis-
harmony and what can be done. By emphasizing their relationship in the
community, justice enables them to rejoin the community spiritually and
socially.1 8' Thus, I want to underscore the importance of Professor
Delgado's reference to "psychic" or "spiritual" healing and to suggest that
this may be an appropriate future direction for CRT scholars who are
engaged in the epistemic debates about the nature of"justice."
Professor Delgado made a second point that I found quite impor-
tant.182 He queried the meaning of the concept of "justice," asking
whether is it found in a civil rights case or whether it is found at some
higher level. CRT enables us to engage in a practice of transformative
thought, acknowledging truths about our experience and the possibilities
for our future. It enables us to commence a process of self-healing and
allows us to contemplate what conditions would have to exist to reach
reconciliation about past injustice and to overcome present injustice. The
"illusion of reality" is found in the formalistic structures of law that define
and limit our possibilities for the future. However, we, as CPT scholars
and members of the communities that have experienced injustice, have
the capacity to imagine a far different reality. We also have the training
and institutional access necessary to bring that reality into being. The
"idealist" and "materialist" frameworks operate simultaneously in this
process. As Derrick Bell wrote in the afterword to Crossroads, Directions
and a New Critical Race Theory:
Our writing is our art. Like all art, it may come in many forms,
but it must be grounded in truth as we see it. That truth may
and will evolve with our understanding and come to reflect
the wisdom that emerges with experiences. [CRT scholars] of-
fer unusual perspectives and unfailing insights into the evils of
178. See generally, JUSTICE As HEALING: INDIGENOUS WAYS (Wanda D. McCaslin, ed.
2005).
179. Robert Yazzie, Healing as Justice: The Navajo Response to Crime, supra note 179, at
121-33.
180. Id. at 125.
181. YAmAmOTO, supra note 137, at 167.
182. Delgado, Keynote Address, supra note 175.
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our time. That is our mission in life, and our contribution to
the future. 183
Other scholars may criticize CRT scholarship as "unrealistic," as "bi-
ased" and perhaps claim that we are straying too far afield from the
"rational" formality of Anglo-American jurisprudence. But it is precisely
because CRT scholars are able to transcend the ordinary categories that
have defined our "reality" that we may one day be able to redefine that
reality in ways that are more appropriate for the future of the people who
we serve: our ancestors, our relatives, and the future generations.
183. Derrick A. Bell, The Handmaid's Truth, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY 412 (Francisco Valdes et al., eds. 2002).
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